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Recent Developments 
Casey v. Planned Parenthood: 
SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT 
ST ATES MAY ENACT MEA-
SURES WHICH PERSUADE 
WOMEN TO CHOOSE CHILD-
BIRTH OVER ABORTION. 
In Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), the Supreme 
Court rejected the trimester framework 
established by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973), and held that the constitu-
tionality of abortion regulations before 
fetal viability must be judged by an 
''undue burden" standard. In so hold-
ing, the Court affirmed the essential 
holding of Roe, which recognized a 
woman's right to terminate her preg-
nancy before viability without undue 
interference from the state. However, 
it significantly deviated from Roe by 
holding that a state is permitted to 
enact measures designed to persuade 
women to choose childbirth over abor-
tion so long as those measures do not 
constitute an undue burden on the ex-
ercise of that right. 
Five provisions of the Pennsylva-
nia Abortion Control Act of 1982 as 
amended in 1988 and 1989 (the "Act") 
were challenged by Petitioners, five 
abortion clinics and one physician on 
behalf of a class of physicians per-
forming abortions ("Petitioners"). The 
provisions of the Act required that: (1) 
a woman seeking an abortion give her 
informed consent prior to the abortion 
procedure, (2) a woman be provided 
with certain information prior to the 
procedure, (3) minors obtain parental 
consent, (4) married women notify their 
husbands prior to the abortion proce-
dure, and (5) facilities performing abor-
tion procedures comply with certain 
reporting requirements. In anticipa-
tion of the provisions taking effect, the 
Petitioners brought suit in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania seeking de-
claratory and injunctive relief. The 
district court ruled all of the provisions 
unconstitutional and issued a perma-
nent injunction prohibiting their en-
forcement. The Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit upheld all of the 
regulations except for the spousal noti-
fication requirement. The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
clarify the central holding in Roe. 
The Court used a three part analysis 
in its examination of the holding inRoe 
v. Wade. Casey. 112 S. Ct. at 2804. 
The Court noted that the central hold-
ing of Roe, recognized the following: 
(1) the woman's right to choose to have 
an abortion before viability without 
state interference, (2) the state's power 
to restrict abortion after viability with 
exceptions for danger to the life or 
health ofthe mother, and (3) the state's 
legitimate interest from the outset of 
pregnancy in protecting both the life of 
the mother and health ofthe fetus. 
In its analysis, the Court first reaf-
firmed that a woman's constitutional 
interest in the right to an abortion be-
fore fetal viability was a fundamental 
liberty interest protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Id. Citing prior settled 
decisions, the Court next affirmed the 
fundamental principle that the Consti-
tution limits the state's power to inter-
fere with parenthood and family deci-
sions. Id. at 2806. The Court also 
acknowledged the strong moral and 
political feelings that the abortion de-
cision engendered. Id. at 2806. De-
clining to become entangled in those 
"feelings," the Court strove to deter-
mine only ''whether the state can re-
solve these . . . questions in such a 
defmitive way that a woman lacks all 
choice in the matter." Id. 
The Court noted that the constitu-
tion protects the right of a person to be 
"free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child" Id. at 
2807 (quotingEisenstadtv. Baird,405 
U.S. 438, 453 (1972». The Court 
recognized that abortion is a unique 
act, but acknowledged that a state may 
not proscribe it in all instances because 
the liberty of a woman "is at stake in a 
sense unique to the human condition 
and so unique to the law." Id The 
Court concluded that any reservations 
it may have had about affirming Roe 
were outweighed by the concept of 
personal liberty under the Due Process 
Clause and the principles of stare 
decisis. Id. 
To further justify its refusal to over-
rule Roe, the Court reviewed the prin-
ciples of institutional integrity and 
concluded that the cost of overruling 
Roe in the face of pressure to do so by 
certain societal interests would cause 
profound damage to the Court's .integ-
rity as an institution dedicated to the 
rule oflaw. Id. at 2814-15. Thus, the 
Court recognized that the fundamental 
decision of Roe was based on a consti-
tutional analysis which it could not 
now repUdiate. Id at 2817. 
The Court next turned to the impor-
tant question of defming the limits of a 
woman's protected liberty interest.ld 
The Court reasoned that it was re-
quired to draw a line where the state 
may not interfere with a woman's right 
to control her own body in order to give 
meaning to the protected liberty. Id 
The Court reaffirmed that viability was 
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where it drew this line. Id. Most im-
portantly, the Court noted that, be-
cause viability was the point at which 
a fetus could survive outside the womb, 
viability also marked the time when a 
fetus became deserving of state protec-
tion.Id. at 2818. While recognizing 
that a woman's right to terminate her 
pregnancy before viability was the cen-
tral holding of Roe, the Court pointed 
out that Roe also recognized the impor-
tance ofthe state's interest in "poten-
tiallife." Id. 
The Court then examined the tri-
mester framework established by Roe 
in light ofthe state's interest in "poten-
tiallife." Id. at 2819. The Court found 
that the trimester framework had the 
effect of contradicting some of the 
state's permissible powers in the early 
stages of a woman's pregnancy. Id. 
Because the Court believed the trimes-
ter framework undervalued the state's 
interest in "potential life," the Court 
rejected the trimester framework 
adopted in Roe. Id. 
The Court next addressed whether 
limitations on a woman's rightto abort 
pre-viability fetuses were permissible. 
Id. at 2819. The Court held that ifthe 
law was not designed to strike at the 
abortion right itself and had the inci-
dental effect of making the right more 
difficult to exercise, then such a law 
would not be invalidated. Id. Only 
where a law imposed an undue burden 
on the exercise of the right would the 
state be held to have interfered with the 
liberty interest ofthe woman protected 
by the Due Process Clause. Id. Under 
the Court's analysis, laws which "do 
no more than create a structural mecha-
nism by which the state . . . may 
express a profound respect for the life 
ofthe unborn are permitted, if they are 
not a substantial obstacle to the 
woman's exercise of the right to 
choose." Id. at 2821. 
The Court then applied the "undue 
burden" standard to the provisions of 
the Act. Id. at 2822. The Court first 
addressed the Act's definition of"medi-
cal emergency" and found that it was 
central to the operation of the other 
provisions of the Act. Id. The Court 
concluded that limiting abortions in 
certain situations to medical emergen-
cies, as defined under the Act and as 
construed by the court of appeals im-
posed no "undue burden" on a 
woman's right to an abortion. Id. at 
2822. 
The Court next addressed the in-
formed consent requirement of the Act. 
Id. The Court concluded that requiring 
specific information be given to the 
woman regarding the gestational age 
of the unborn child, the availability of 
alternatives to abortion and including a 
mandatory 24 hour waiting period, did 
not constitute an ''undue burden." Id. 
at 2823-24. The Court reasoned that 
even if the information given expressed 
a preference for childbirth over abor-
tion, the giving of truthful, non-mis-
leading information ensured that a 
woman understood the full impact of 
her decision. Id. at 2823. In so hold-
ing, the Court overruled certain por-
tions of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 
416 (1983) ("Akron f'), and Thornbird 
v. American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.747 
(1986). Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823. 
Turning to the 24 hour waiting pe-
riod, the Court overruled its decision in 
Akron I which held that a 24 hour 
waiting period served no legitimate 
state concern. Id. at 2824. The Court 
held that an informed decision would 
be promoted by some period of reflec-
tion, particularly where information 
concerning the abortion decision was 
given to the woman. Id. The Court 
acknowledged that the waiting period 
was a substantial obstacle for women 
who lacked financial resources or were 
burdened by other considerations such . 
as explaining their whereabouts to 
employers or family. Id. at 2825. 
Nevertheless, the court concluded that 
the effect of "increasing the cost and 
risk of delay of abortions" did not 
constitute an ''undue burden." Id. 
Addressing the husband notifica-
tion requirement of the Act, the Court 
concluded that based on expert testi-
mony and evidence presented to the 
lower court regarding domestic vio-
lence, the husband notification require-
ment was likely to prevent a significant 
numberofwomenfromobtainingabor-
tions. Id. at 2829. The Court con-
cluded that the father's interest in the 
potential life did not justify permitting 
a state to empower him with veto power 
over his wife's decision. Id. at 2833. 
The Court treated the parental noti-
fication requirements of the Act sum-
marily, holding that a state may require 
consent of the parent or guardian prior 
to a minor obtaining an abortion so 
long as there is an adequate judicial 
bypass. Id. at 2832. Finally, the Court 
found the record keeping requirements 
of the Act permissible. Id. The Court 
held that the requirements were rea-
sonably related to the ''preservation of 
maternal health and. . . that they 
properly respected a patient's confi-
dentiality and privacy." Id. (quoting 
Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976». 
Thus, the Court upheld all of the 
provisions of the Act with the excep-
tion of the husband notification re-
quirement enunciating an ''undue bur-
den" standard by which to assess the 
constitutionality oflaws which restrict 
a woman's right to choose abortion 
prior to fetal viability. The opinion 
was joined by concurring and dissent-
ing opinions from all sides. While 
accepting its responsibility to "defme 
the freedom guaranteed by the 
Constitution's ... promise of liberty," 
the Court has charted a course which 
will continue to engender confusion 
among courts and legislatures and en-
danger the liberty of women to control 
their reproductive lives. Thus, it is 
clear that the Court's decision in Casey 
has not secured for women the consti-
tutional protection of their liberty guar-
anteed by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. . 
- Sue Lawless 
CipoUone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: 
FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABEL-
ING LAWS DO NOT PREEMPT 
CERTAIN STATE AND COMMON 
LAW ACTIONS. 
In a controversial case of flI'St im-
pression, the United States Supreme 
Court held in Cipollonev. Liggett Group, 
Inc., 112 s. Ct. 2608 (1992) that the 
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 
1969 ("1969 Act") did not preclude a 
smoker who developed lungcancerfrom 
suing cigarette manufacturers undercer-
tain state and common law theories. 
The smoker's claims for breach of ex-
press warranty, intentional ftaud and 
misrepresentation, and conspiracy were 
upheld despite the 1969 Act's warning 
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